THE

Detector Detected:

OR, THE

DANGER

To which our

CONSTITUTION now lies expoſed,

Set in a

True and manifeſt LIGHT.

JOB xi. 2, 3.

Should not the Multitude of Words be anſwered? And ſhould a Man full of Talk be juſtified? Should thy Lies make Men hold their Peace? And when thou mockeſt, ſhall no Man make thee aſhamed?

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THE

Detector Detected.

AS ſoon as I had read in the News-Papers the Title of the Book which gave Occaſion for what follows, and had heard it laid to a noble Peer, whoſe Writings and Speeches had formerly given me great Satisfaction, I ſent directly for it to my Bookſeller; but the Cloſeneſs of the Print, and the Number of the Pages, together with that Confuſion and Obſcurity in the Stile, which I obſerved in every Paragraph upon which I at firſt caſt my Eye, gave me ſuch a Diſtaſte, and ſuch an Aſſurance of its not being the Offspring of that noble Peer, that, without a Peruſal, I condemned it to the common Fate of ſuch Performances; and ſhould have made the proper Uſe of it, if I had not heard it induſtriouſly recommended, and its being unanſwerable ſtrongly inſiſted on, by ſome of our *new miniſterial Tools*. Upon this, I reſolved, however troubleſome, to read it over *with Attention*; and now, after having finiſhed my *laborious* and *perplexing* Taſk, I muſt ſay, never Author hit his own Character better than this has done, in the Quotation he makes from another upon *Nonſenſe*. *

As this is the true Character of the Book, and as the true Author, as well as Compiler, is now

 pretty

* See *Faction Detected*, P. 160.

pretty well known, the World may perhaps look upon both with ſo much Contempt as to think, that neither deſerves a ſerious Reply; but as this voluminous Piece ſeems deſign'd, by its Verboſity, Prolixity, and Sophiſtry, to confound Mankind, and to lead them into a Belief, that our Conſtitution is in no Danger, or that it is impoſſible to preſerve it, I think it neceſſary, and therefore ſhall endeavour to prevent ſuch a fatal Effect, not by a regular Anſwer to this *elaborate Piece of Nonſenſe*, which, after ſo many Anſwers, is become quite unneceſſary, but by treating in a juſt and diſtinct Manner thoſe Points, which by this Author are moſt groſly and moſt wickedly miſrepreſented; in order thereby to eſtabliſh the Principles of our Government upon their right Baſis, and to ſhew the Danger we are now in of having them fundamentally overturn'd. For this Purpoſe I ſhall anſwer, as briefly as I can, the four following Queſtions.

Firſt, What is the *original and true* Conſtitution of our Government, and whether it is not in greater Danger of being ſubverted, by the Methods we have taken to *new model* it ſince the *Reſtoration*, than ever it was before.

Secondly, What the People expected from the *late Oppoſers*, and were by them *moſt induſtriouſly* taught to expect.

Thirdly, How the *late Change* was brought about, and particularly whether it was by any *effectual Power* now ſubſiſting in the People, or by the Imprudence or Puſillanimity of the then Prime Miniſter, eſpecially by his believing himſelf to be in a State of Security, from the ill Succeſs of the *famous Motion* at the End of laſt Parliament.

Fourthly, What we have got by the *late Change* in our Adminiſtration, how we got it, and whether it is like to be of any Advantage to us.

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The Reader will ſee, that every one of theſe Queſtions conſiſts of two or more Parts, each of which I ſhall anſwer in courſe, and occaſionally take notice of ſome of the moſt deceitful and dangerous Miſrepreſentations or Falſhoods contained in this *ſcurrilous Libel*, which have not hitherto been fully enough expoſed. To begin with my firſt Queſtion: If I had Leiſure, and if my deſign'd Brevity would permit me to enter deep into this Subject, I could ſhew, that all the Miſeries which have been brought upon Mankind by *lawleſs Power and arbitrary Rule*, proceed from Mens not diſtinguiſhing properly between *Dignity* and *Power*. By *Dignity*, I mean that Reſpect and Eſteem, which a Man has in his Country or Neighbourhood: By *Power*, I mean ſocial *Power*, or that Power which proceeds from the Laws, Cuſtoms, or Regulations of any particular Society, and not from the Property or Qualities of any particular Perſon. The former may, nay will go by *hereditary Right*; whereas the latter never ought to go by *hereditary Right*, but by *Election* of ſome Kind or other. The Son of a great and ancient Family, or of a Man who has done great Services to his Country, will have *Dignity*, even tho' by the Laws of his Country he has neither *Titles* nor *Power*; and if he ſhould ſtand Candidate for *Power* againſt a Man of *no Dignity*, nor any ſuperior Merit, he ought to be preferred: If he has equal Addreſs, as well as equal Merit, he certainly will be preferred. But whatever may have been the Merit of a Man's Father or Anceſtors, if he has in himſelf *no Merit*, he ought not to be inveſted with *Power*, becauſe the Society may ſuffer greatly by the weak or wicked Uſe he makes of it. This Conſideration will ſhew how neceſſary it is to make a Diſtinction between *Dignity* and *Power*, and yet this Diſtinction has never, ſo far as I have read, been properly made by any but the

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antient *Germans*. By them it was well underſtood and duly obſerved. They had *hereditary Kings* as well as *hereditary Princes* or *Nobles*; but both were Titles of *Dignity* only. The Titles paſſed by *hereditary Right*; but *no Power* was annexed to either; for the Aſſembly of the People was the *Supreme Lawgiver and Judge* of the Society; and there they choſe their *Chief General* in Time of War, which was uſually the King, if he was thought as fit for that *high Office* as any other Member of the Society; as to which they were certainly in the right: *Nations* may be governed by *Councils*, but *an Army* muſt be conducted by *one ſingle Man*; therefore it ought always to have a Man of *Senſe*, *Courage*, and *Experience at its Head*; for it is ridiculous to expoſe *Thouſands of brave Men* to almoſt certain Deſtruction, by putting them under the Command of *a Madman or Fool, only becauſe his Mother ſaid he was the Son of her Huſband.*

That this was the antient *German* Conſtitution I could evince, as clearly as the lame and dark Accounts we have of thoſe People can be ſuppoſed to admit; and I could ſhew, that the Form of Government eſtabliſhed in this Country by the *Saxons* was of the very ſame Nature; but this would lead me into a more ample Reſearch into our antient Hiſtory than is neceſſary for my preſent Purpoſe. I mention it only to ſhew, that if we ever reſolve to do what, even this Author admits, ought to be frequently done, for the Preſervation of the Conſtitution of any Country; I ſay, *if we ever reſolve to bring our Government back to its firſt Principles* *, we muſt ſearch for thoſe Principles among our Anceſtors the *Saxons*; for by *William the Conqueror* our Conſtitution, our Laws, nay and almoſt our whole Property too, except what belonged to our then *treacherous Churchmen*, were entirely overturn'd.

* See *Faction Detected*, P. 141.

turn'd. Our Conſtitution or Government, ſince that Time, has been in a continual State of Variation and Uncertainty: Sometimes Abſolute, ſometimes Anarchy, ſometimes a mild and limited Monarchy, according to the Genius of the Prince upon the Throne, and the reigning Spirit among our Nobles: The King inſiſting upon *Prerogative*, the Nobles upon *returning to the Laws of* EDWARD THE CONFESSOR, among them a *Cant-Word* made uſe of on account of its being agreeable to the People, tho' it was certainly what they either did not underſtand, or would not have agreed to; becauſe it would have ſtript them of a great deal of their Power, and lodg'd it where it antiently was, and always ought to be, *in the free Choice of the People*; for every one knows, that according to the *Saxon* Conſtitution, which was in Part reſtored after the Conqueſt, all *Officers* were either *choſen by the People* in their ſeveral Counties, or appointed by Act of Parliament, or, as our Hiſtorians expreſs it, *by the King in Parliament*; and thoſe great Officers ſo appointed had the *abſolute Nomination* of thoſe under Officers employ'd directly under themſelves: They were not then all under *a Prime Miniſter*, removable at his Pleaſure, and conſequently obliged to follow his Directions in every ſuch Nomination. If this, which was our *original Conſtitution*, were reſtored, it would, indeed, effectually prevent any Danger from a Power of corrupt Influence in the Crown; and, I am afraid, *without ſomething like this we can never do it effectually.*

Tho' this is entering deeper into the Nature of our Conſtitution, than moſt of our modern Politicians will care to follow me in, yet I thought it neceſſary to premiſe ſo much, becauſe from hence will appear the Reaſon, why our *Contenders for Kingly Power* take Care, never to go farther back than the *Conqueſt*. That is to ſay, in order to ſhew us what our Conſtitution was *originally*, they fix upon a

Time

Time *when it was totally overturn'd*, and as abſolute a Government ſet up, as was ever eſtabliſh'd in any Country, which was our Caſe during the whole Reign of *William the Conqueror*. But as the *Norman* Chiefs were ſenſible of the Benefits accruing to the Subject from our antient *Saxon* Form of Government, and as they got their Power eſtabliſhed by the Contention among the Sons and Succeſſors of *William*, they took Care to confine the Power of the Crown under pretty ſtrict Limitations, *ſo far as related to themſelves*; and at laſt by the Attachment of *Henry the Third* to his *foreign Favourites*, and the Diſcontents thereby occaſioned, the People got ſome Sort of Reſemblance of the *Saxon* Form of Government reſtored; and our Conſtitution aſſumed that Form in which it at preſent, in ſome Meaſure, exiſts. But it would be eaſy to ſhew, that the People were at that Time far from recovering all the Power they were formerly poſſeſs'd of; and that they have ſince loſt ſome of the Powers they then recover'd or were poſſeſs'd of, without acquiring any new in their Stead; for tho' there may now be a greater Share of Property in the Hands of the People than was at any Time from the *Conqueſt* to the *Reſtoration*, yet as *Property* of itſelf gives no *ſocial Power*, nor, indeed, any great *natural Power*, when it is divided among *ſuch a Number* as can never enter into a *general Concert*, therefore the Power of the People cannot from thence be juſtly ſaid to have increaſed.

After having thus ſhewn, where we are to ſearch for the *firſt Principles of our Government*, in caſe we ſhould ever reſolve to bring it back to them, I muſt obſerve, that *ſocial Power* is either legiſlative, juriſdictive, or military. Under the firſt I include that Sort of ſocial Power which is or may be called Conſultative, and under the two laſt I include that ſocial Power which is called Executive; ſo that every Sort of ſocial Power muſt either be legiſla-

tive, juriſdictive, or military; and when I conſider what a ſmall Share of the two laſt is now lodged in the People, and compare it with what they formerly enjoyed, eſpecially before the *Conqueſt*, I am ſurpriſed, how any Man can have ſo *wrong a Head* as to imagine, or ſo *falſe a Heart* as to aſſert, that the Power of the People is now greater, or near ſo great as it ought to be according to the *firſt Principles* of our Government; eſpecially now, when every Power remaining in the Hands of the People, whether legiſlative, juriſdictive, or military, is like to be turned againſt them *by the Prevalence of Bribery and Corruption.*

This is now the Danger to which our Conſtitution lies expoſed, and I ſhall ſhew, that this Danger is greater and more formidable than any Danger it was ever expoſed to. Tho' our People have long ſince relinquiſhed or given up the chief Part of the Share they had in the military Power of the Society, yet they have ſtill retained ſuch a Share in the legiſlative and juriſdictive, as enables them to give *a Check* to the Power of the Crown, when they find it has been exerciſed, or is like to be exerciſed to the Prejudice of the Society. No Law can be paſſed, no Money raiſed, nor any regular Army kept up, without the Conſent of both Houſes of Parliament: The Houſe of Peers are ſtill the ſupreme and ultimate Judges of Property; and by the Proſecution of the Commons and Judgment of the Peers, any Miniſter or Magiſtrate may be puniſhed, if he makes a bad Uſe of the Power with which he is intruſted. In this conſiſts the Freedom of our Government, and the Eſſence as well as Happineſs of our Conſtitution, according to its preſent Form; and while we have a free and independent Parliament, *this will be a Protection to the Innocent, and a Terror to the Guilty.*

In all theſe Caſes, and in every Caſe that comes before Parliament, as alſo in all Caſes relating to the

Chuſing of Magiſtrates or Members of Parliament, every Voter ought to determine himſelf by that alone which he thinks moſt for the *publick Good*. At Elections, every Man ought to vote for that Candidate, who, he thinks, has the *beſt Head* and the *ſoundeſt Heart*; and in Parliament, every Member ought in all Caſes to vote for that Side of the Queſtion which appears to be moſt for the *Good of his Country*. All Conſiderations of a *private or ſelfiſh Nature* ought to be thrown entirely aſide. But this it is impoſſible to expect: Men will have a Regard to, and be determined by their private Views, and will therefore be directed by thoſe who can *beſt anſwer*, or are *ableſt to defeat* thoſe Views. This it is impoſſible by human Policy to prevent: By Penal Laws we may prevent the Influence of publick and avowed Menaces, Promiſes, or Gratuities; but we cannot prevent the Influence of thoſe that are *of a ſecret or reſerved Nature*. With Reſpect to theſe, all we can do, is to prevent any *one Man*, or *Set of Men*, from poſſeſſing ſo much Riches or Power as to be able to ſpread this Poiſon *univerſally* among the People, and thereby get the *whole Power* of the Society into his or their Hands; and this we ought moſt cautiouſly to prevent, becauſe our Government would then become an abſolute and arbitrary Monarchy or Ariſtocracy.

In this Country, tho' we have nothing like an *Agrarian Law*, we are as yet in no Danger of this Effect from the Power or Opulence of any private Family or Corporation; but from the increaſed Power and Opulence of the Crown, we are now in the utmoſt Danger; for if ever the Crown ſhould by *ſecret or reſerved* Menaces, Promiſes, or Gratuities, gain the abſolute Direction of a Majority in each Houſe of Parliament, the People will be diſabled from giving *any Check* to the Power of the Crown. Can we ſuppoſe, that ſuch a Parliament would refuſe any Sum the Crown deſired, or to

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raiſe it in any Manner the Crown preſcribed? Would ſuch a Parliament ſcruple to paſs any Law preſented to them by the Directions of a *Prime Miniſter*, or without his Conſent paſs the *moſt popular Bill* that could be brought before them? His Signal would give a Sanction to the former: His ſingle No, would ſtamp the other with a *Veto*. Would ſuch a Parliament ſuſpend their Approbation to the moſt infamous Treaty of Peace, or cenſure the *moſt ſcandalous Conduct of any warlike Expedition?* Would ſuch a Parliament ever call a favourite Miniſter to Account? Would they puniſh a favourite Judge for perverting Judgment? Would not they acquit the moſt notorious publick Pilferer? Would not they condemn the moſt innocent Aſſertor of his Country's Rights? In ſuch a Caſe could any Man's Life, Liberty, or Property be ſafe? Could he ſecure himſelf by any Means, but by the moſt abject Submiſſion to the *Grand Seignor and his Divan?* For the Members of ſuch a Parliament, *for their own Sakes*, would take Care to keep up ſuch a numerous Army, as would prevent the Poſſibility of Reſiſtance. In ſhort, we ſhould have a moſt arbitrary as well as abſolute Monarchy eſtabliſhed; and what would be moſt provoking, *the Miniſter and his Tools would boaſt of their Sovereign's having always made the Laws of the Land the Rule of his Conduct.*

This would be our Caſe during the Continuance of ſuch a Parliament; and by multiplying *Penal Laws*, and *inferior Offices* in the Cuſtoms and Exciſe, the Crown might, from *one ſingle* Parliament of this Kind, get ſuch an extenſive Influence, as to be able to command a Majority of our Elections, which would ſecure to the Crown a Power of having always from that Time forth a Majority of *miniſterial Tools and Creatures* in both Houſes of Parliament; and this would put a final, an irrecoverable End to our preſent happy Conſtitution.

Againſt this Danger the Houſe of Peers could be no effectual Safeguard; for tho' that Houſe has, by our Conſtitution, *ſome Sort of Check* upon the Power of creating Peers, yet they have ſo ſeldom exerciſed it, and have ſo conſtantly ſubmitted to the Will of their Sovereign in this Reſpect, that I queſtion much if they will ever hereafter venture to diſpute the Power of the Crown, eſpecially againſt a King, ſupported by an obedient and mercenary Army, and a more obedient and more mercenary Houſe of Commons; and as long as the Crown enjoys an uncontrolable Power of ſending *whom it pleaſes*, and *as many* as it pleaſes *at a Time*, into that Houſe, our Houſe of Peers can never be *any Check* upon the Conduct of a favourite Miniſter. Beſides, the many Poſts, Places, and Penſions the Crown has now at its arbitrary Diſpoſal, moſt of which it can likewiſe take away at Pleaſure, may contribute towards eſtabliſhing a corrupt Influence in that Houſe as well as the other; and the unbounded Liberty our Peers now have, not only to ſquander their Eſtates, but to grant them away from the Succeſſor to the Title, will always leave ſome of them ſo deſtitute as not to be able to ſupport the Dignity of their *hereditary Title*, without ſome Poſt or Penſion from the Crown, which will of Courſe prevent their ever oppoſing any miniſterial Meaſure.

Now if this ſhould ever come to be our unfortunate Caſe, what ſocial Power, pray, could the People be ſuppoſed to have? I can think of none *but the Power of ſelling themſelves at Elections*; and even this would be in a few Years at an End; for no Man would give himſelf the Trouble to ſet up for Member againſt the *Court Intereſt*: Even that of being allowed to be a Member of Parliament, would become a Bait for ſome vain Coxcomb, and would attach him to the Miniſter as much as a Red Ruban has done, or can be ſuppoſed to do. In theſe Circumſtances, what Redreſs could the

People

People have? How could they recover their Liberties or Conſtitution? As the Crown is ſuppoſed to have got the abſolute Command over a Majority of our Elections, the People could expect no Relief from any new Parliament: And as they have not only given up almoſt all the Share they had in the military Power of the Society, but have fallen into a moſt ſhameful Diſuſe of Arms, and a moſt groſs Ignorance of all military Diſcipline, a very ſmall Army, much ſmaller than is commonly imagined, would be ſufficient for ſecuring the Crown againſt a moſt general Inſurrection of the People. This Army would be regularly furniſhed, from Year to Year, by ſuch a mercenary Parliament, under Pretence of guarding againſt an Inſurrection or Invaſion, or of giving Weight to ſome foreign Negotiation; and after being kept for ſome Time under military Law and Diſcipline, our Conſtitution would become irrecoverable: A *Prime Vizier* might indeed be ſtrangled, perhaps a *Sultan* depoſed, by a Mutiny among the Soldiers; but it could not be expected, that an Army of *Janizaries* would ever think of reſtoring a free and limited Government.

Having thus briefly ſhewn the Origin and Nature of our Conſtitution, and the Danger to which it is now chiefly expoſed, I come next to conſider the other Part of my firſt Queſtion, which is to examine, Whether our Conſtitution is not now in greater Danger of being ſubverted, than ever it was before the *Reſtoration*. The Danger of the Crown's gaining an eſtabliſhed corrupt Influence over a Majority of our Elections, is, indeed, of all others the greateſt. Like *Moſes*'s Serpent, it has got all the others in its Belly; and I ſhall ſhew, that till the *Reſtoration*, or rather till ſome Time after the *Revolution*, this Danger ſcarcely had a Being: But ſince that Period, the publick Revenue has been ſo much increaſed, and the Poſts, Commiſſions, and Offices, at the ſole Diſpoſal of the Crown,

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ſo multiplied, that I am ſurpriſed to hear any Gentleman queſtion our Conſtitution's being now more expoſed to this Danger than ever it was before; and it is ſtill more ſurpriſing to hear Gentlemen of any Knowledge or common Underſtanding talk upon this Subject, of the *Civil Liſt only*, as if that were the *only Branch* of the publick Revenue, which did, or could afford the Crown any corrupt Influence in Parliament or at Elections. Is it not evident, is it not obvious, that *every Branch* of the publick Revenue contributes a conſiderable Share towards this fatal Effect, by the Crown's having the ſole and arbitrary Diſpoſal, not only of all the Commiſſions and Offices concerned in the Collection, but likewiſe of all the Commiſſions and Offices, to the Support of which the publick Revenue is applied? And this Danger is vaſtly increaſed, by the Crown's having not only the arbitrary Power of granting all Offices and Commiſſions, but alſo the arbitrary Power of removing or diſmiſſing from the publick Service, almoſt all the Officers that are, or can be employed in it. This, I ſay, adds vaſtly to the Danger, and the Influence proceeding from this Power of diſmiſſing, is of the very worſt Sort of corrupt Influence, becauſe it is founded upon Fear, which debaſes the Minds of the Perſons influenced, and makes them *of all Slaves the moſt ſlaviſh*. If Commiſſions and Offices were all granted *quamdiu ſe bene geſſerint*, the corrupt Influence of the Crown could proceed only from the *Hopes of Preferment*, which has ſomething more generous in its Nature, than that which proceeds from *Fear*; whereas this arbitrary Power of removing without any Cauſe aſſigned, keeps not only all the Officers employed in the publick Service, but all their Friends and Relations, in perpetual Dread of their being diſmiſſed; and as they are all ſenſible, as late Experience has made them ſenſible, that the giving of a wrong Vote in Parliament, or at any Election,

is the higheſt Crime they can commit againſt a Miniſter, it is not to be doubted but all, or by far the greateſt Part of them, will in all ſuch Caſes receive with the greateſt Submiſſion, and follow with the blindeſt Obedience, any Directions *a Miniſter* ſhall pleaſe to iſſue from his *miniſterial Throne.*

How ridiculous, therefore, is it in the preſent Caſe to talk of the *Civil Liſt only*, and of the Money that may from thence be ſpared for Secret Services, as if there were no Sort of corrupt Influence but that which proceeds from Penſions or Bribes in ready Money; when it is ſo plain, that every Commiſſion, every Poſt, every Office, every Employment, from the higheſt to the loweſt, contributes to the corrupt Influence of the Crown, and operates both Ways, by Hopes upon thoſe that expect it, either for themſelves or their Friend, by Fears upon the Perſon that has got it, and upon all his Friends? This Sort of corrupt Influence is not only more extenſive than that which proceeds from Penſions or Bribes in ready Money, but in a double Reſpect more dangerous: Firſt, becauſe it may operate upon thoſe who have ſome Sort of Honour: A Fellow who betrays his Country for a Penſion or Bribe in ready Money, muſt in his Nature be treacherous, mean-ſpirited, and ſlaviſh; but a Tender or a Grant of a good Poſt or Employment, may influence a Man of ſome Honour: His Ambition prompts him to accept of the infamous Bargain, and his Gratitude binds him after it is ſtruck. And, Secondly, the corrupt Influence, which proceeds from Offices and Employments, may be more ſecretly and more ſafely applied: It is dangerous for a Miniſter, either by himſelf or his Tools, to offer Penſions or Bribes upon Condition of Voting. This muſt be done in direct and expreſs Terms, and the Perſon to whom the Offer is made, or the Miniſter's Tools, may become Evidence againſt him, eſpecially if an Act ſhould be

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paſſed for *indemnifying and rewarding them* upon their being ſo; but there is no Neceſſity for telling a Man he ſhall have a Poſt or Employment upon Condition of his Voting according to Directions: A Miniſter may by his Practice ſhew, and moſt Miniſters will by their Practice ſhew, that no Man ſhall have or continue to enjoy any Poſt or Employment in the Diſpoſal of the Crown, unleſs he votes upon all Occaſions according to Directions from the Miniſter: This is what I call corrupt Influence by *reſerved* Menaces, Promiſes, or Gratuities; and it will have the ſame Effect upon all that enjoy or expect ſuch Poſts or Employments, as if an expreſs Bargain were to be ſtruck with every one; and at the ſame Time, it will render it impoſſible to procure Evidence of any Sort againſt the Miniſter.

Thus, all impartial Men muſt be convinced, that *every Office and Commiſſion in the Diſpoſal of the Crown*, tends to create a dangerous corrupt Influence in the Crown; but it is not thoſe Offices and Commiſſions only that tend to create this Influence, the Diſpoſal of the publick Revenue contributes in every other Reſpect to create or increaſe this Influence. All Contractors with the Government for victualling the Navy, cloathing the Army, carrying on any publick Works, *&c.* muſt be under a corrupt Dependence upon the Crown; for no Man can expect to be employed, *let him offer what Terms he will*, if he be at Variance with the Miniſter; and if his Terms ſhould be ſuch as to make it dangerous or ſcandalous to refuſe them, he muſt expect to meet with *great Difficulties*, both in getting his Materials or Work approved of, and afterwards in getting Payment of the Money due to him. Even our common Sailors, common Soldiers, and thoſe Day-Labourers that are employed in our Dock-yards, and other publick Works, muſt be under the ſame Sort of Dependence, in Hopes

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of *Preferment*, or in order to meet with *gentle Uſage* from the Officers placed over them. I ſhall grant that few of theſe have Votes at any Election, but many of their Friends have, and a Man who votes againſt his Conſcience, or contray to what he would otherwiſe do, for the ſake of procuring *Preferment* or *gentle Uſage* to his Son, Brother, or Relation, is as much under corrupt Influence as he who does ſo upon his own Account. To which I ſhall add, that this Sort of corrupt Influence, as it operates upon the lowermoſt Claſs of our Voters, who do not know the Danger to which they expoſe their Country by their Corruption, is therefore extremely dangerous, becauſe it operates with a ſtronger Effect, and becauſe it contributes greatly towards giving the Crown a Command over a Majority of our Elections, which is more dangerous than the Crown's having a corrupt Influence over a Majority in Parliament. The former corrupts the Root, the latter the Branches only: From a corrupt Root no wholſome Branches can ever proceed; but if the Root be kept clean, the corrupt Branches will in Time die away, and wholſome ones ſpring up in their Stead; which was the Caſe of the long Parliament in King *Charles the Second*'s Reign.

I ſhall now apply what I have ſaid to the ſeveral Articles of Publick Expence, and compute from thence the Sums of Money, which the Crown may annually convert towards gaining a corrupt Influence in Parliament and at Elections. Upon this Head I ſhall grant, that in our Army and Navy, the Pay of the common Soldiers or Sailors does not add a great deal to the corrupt Influence of the Crown, becauſe our People are not yet, thank God! grown ſo poor and lazy as to contend for and ſollicit getting into either of theſe Stations; but the Pay of every Man in our Army or

Navy, in any Station above that of a common Soldier or Sailor, adds to the corrupt Influence of the Crown, becauſe every ſuch Poſt is earneſtly contended for, and conſequently by promiſing or giving ſuch Poſts, or threatning thoſe that have them with being turned out, the Crown may command Votes at Elections or in Parliament. In our Dock-Yards, likewiſe, and other publick Works, the Money paid to Day-Labourers cannot add much to the corrupt Influence of the Crown; but every Shilling paid to Perſons employed in ſuch Works, in any Station above that of a Day-Labourer, muſt add to that corrupt Influence at all Elections either of Members of Parliament, or of thoſe Magiſtrates in many of our Boroughs, who chuſe the Repreſentatives for their Borough.

From hence it muſt appear, that every Increaſe of our Publick Expence muſt add in ſome Proportion to the corrupt Influence of the Crown. What that Proportion may be, is not eaſy to determine, becauſe of the Perquiſites and Profits made by the Officers over and above their ſtated Pay; but if I ſhould reckon, that one half of what is paid for maintaining our Army and Navy, including the Ordnance, Dock-Yards, *&c.* and for carrying on our publick Works, goes into the Pockets of the Officers and other Perſons employed in Stations above that of a common Soldier, Sailor, or Day-Labourer, I ſhould not be far beyond the Mark, as will appear to any one who conſiders the annual Charge of a Regiment of Foot, which, by the Eſtimates given in to Parliament, ought to conſiſt of 815 Men, charged at 15,217 *l.* 9 *s.* 2 *d.* whereas if thoſe 815 Men were all common Soldiers at 6 *d. per Diem* each, the annual Charge would amount to no more than 7436 *l.* 17 *s.* 6 *d. per Annum*, which is not one Half of what is charged upon the Publick for maintaining

a Regiment of Foot. And conſidering, as I have before remarked, that the Crown will always gain a little corrupt Influence, even from what is paid to our common Soldiers, Sailors, and Day-Labourers, I am ſure, I may reckon, that at leaſt one Half of this whole Expence may be converted towards eſtabliſhing a corrupt Influence in the Crown, and conſequently if the Publick Expence upon theſe three Articles amounts to *Three Millions* a Year, it adds 1,500,000 *l.* a Year to that Revenue, which the Crown may convert towards gaining a corrupt Influence at Elections and in Parliament, over and above what it has by the arbitrary Diſpoſal of the Civil Liſt Revenue; and I appeal to our Records, if the annual publick Expence at a Medium between War and Peace, does not amount to *Three Millions* a Year, which far exceeds what it ever was *before the Reſtoration.*

The Method of *Appropriation* introduced ſince the Revolution, has not, nor can have the leaſt Effect againſt this Sort of corrupt Influence; for when an Officer is turned out for the *reſerved* Reaſon of voting *againſt the Court*, and a new Man preferred on the *ſingle*, *but reſerved* Account of voting *in its Favour*, no Man can ſay, the publick Money has been miſapplied, or not applied to the Uſes for which it was appropriated; and the Miniſters will ſay, the King had his ſecret Reaſons for what he did, and no Man has in this Caſe a Right to ſay, What doſt Thou? In this, indeed, I cannot agree with them; becauſe, I think, the Parliament has a Right, and may, when they think proper, enquire into the Removal or Appointment of any Officer; but this does not proceed from the modern Method of *Appropriation*, which this *miniſterial Writer*, like all the reſt of his Fellow-Labourers, boaſts ſo much of, as if the People had thereby gained a great Advantage; in which

I muſt diſſent from them: The People have thereby gained no *new* Advantage, nor has the Crown been laid under any *new* Reſtraint. It is like enacting that to be Law, which was before eſtabliſhed by the common Law. Will theſe Gentlemen ſay, the Parliament did not before that Time know and conſider the Uſes for which it granted the People's Money? Will they ſay, the Parliament had not before that Time a Power to enquire into the Diſpoſal of the Money they granted, and to puniſh the Miniſters, if upon ſuch Enquiry it appeared, that they had converted the People's Money to bad Uſes? This *new* Method of *Appropriation* is therefore expreſſing only, what was always before underſtood: It is like enforcing the common Law by a Statute, which generally does harm, but can do no good; and it can never be of any Signification, when we have a Parliament that never makes any Inquiry, much leſs when we have a Parliament *that will inflict no Puniſhment*, even tho' it ſhould be made appear to them, *that the People's Money has been applied towards enſlaving the People.*

I hope, I have made it evident, that notwithſtanding any *Appropriation* or Regulation hitherto made, the Crown muſt gain a very great Addition of corrupt Influence, by the diſpoſing or laying out the publick Revenue, even when the Whole is duly applied to the Uſes to which it is appropriated. But it is not by the *diſpoſing only* that the Crown may add to this Influence, it gains another very conſiderable Addition by the *collecting* of the publick Revenue, as well as by *diſpoſing* of it after it is *collected*. As the Crown has, by the preſent Maxims of our Conſtitution, not only the Nomination and Appointment of all the Officers employed in the collecting of every Tax we have, except the *Land Tax*, but alſo a Power of appoint-

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ing as many Officers as it pleaſes, and granting them what Salaries it thinks fit; and as all thoſe Officers from the higheſt to the loweſt have ſuch Salaries and Perquiſites, and live in ſuch an opulent or comfortable Manner, that great Sollicitation and Intereſt is made to be preferred even to the meaneſt of them, conſequently every one of theſe Offices furniſhes the Crown with a Power to command Votes at Elections or in Parliament, by promiſing or granting them to thoſe who vote at Elections for *Court Candidates*, and threatning ſuch as are in Office with being diſmiſſed, if they vote at any Election for a Candidate in the *Country Intereſt:* And as I have obſerved before, the common Practice of a Miniſter, with reſpect to preferring and diſmiſſing Officers, will, in all ſuch Caſes, be as effectual as expreſs Promiſes and Threats: Nay this Practice will have an Influence upon many of their Friends, without any Sollicitation from them, and therefore our Laws which prohibit *Exciſemen*, &c, to ſollicit Votes at Elections, can no way prevent the Operation of this Influence upon their Friends and Relations.

From hence it is evident, that the collecting of the publick Revenue furniſhes the Crown with an additional corrupt Influence, equal in yearly Value to the Amount of all the Salaries and Perquiſites of the Officers concerned in the Collection. What this yearly Amount may be is impoſſible to determine exactly; but from the Difference between *the groſs and net Produce* of our Taxes, according to Accounts given in to Parliament, I believe it may, upon an Average, be reckoned equal to *one fourth Part* of the *net Produce* of all our Taxes excepting the *Land Tax*. Conſequently if the *net Produce* of all the Taxes we have, beſide the *Land Tax*, amounts to *Five Millions Sterling*, including thoſe appropriated to the Payment of our Debts and to

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the Civil Liſt, as well as thoſe appropriated yearly to the current Service, it muſt be admitted, that the collecting of the publick Revenue furniſhes the Crown with a corrupt Influence over our Elections, to the Amount of 1,250,000 *l.* a Year; moſt Part of which has accrued to the Crown ſince the *Reſtoration*; for before that Period, we ſeldom or never had any Taxes, but ſuch as were of the Nature of our *Land Tax*, except the *Tonnage and Poundage*, none of which, by their Collection, could furniſh the Crown with any great corrupt Influence over Elections, becauſe there were but few Officers employed, and very ſmall Salaries given, as appears from the Salaries now appropriated to thoſe Offices in the Cuſtoms that were eſtabliſhed *before the Reſtoration.*

As to the *Land Tax*, it never did, nor does now furniſh the Crown with any conſiderable corrupt Influence; becauſe the Crown has the Appointing of none of the Officers concerned in the Collection, except the Commiſſioners of Taxes *(a moſt uſeleſs Commiſſion)* and the Collectors in the ſeveral Counties. Yet ſo fond are our Miniſters of this Sort of Influence, ſo averſe from parting with the leaſt Article of it, that when a Motion was made ſome Years ago in Parliament, to give the Counties the Appointment of their Collectors, and to make them anſwerable for them, as is now, and was then the Practice in *Scotland*, our Miniſters would not agree to it, and conſequently, *according to Cuſtom of late Years*, the Queſtion was carried in the *Negative*, tho' it was admitted, that this Alteration could be attended with no Inconvenience to the Publick, and would free the Publick of the Riſk it now runs by the Collectors and their Securities becoming inſolvent.

And as to the Tax called *Tonnage* and *Poundage*, I ſhall grant, that when it was not in Farm, the Crown

Crown had the Appointment of all the Officers concerned in its Collection, as it has now of all the Officers concerned in collecting our Customs; but as the Duties upon Importation were then very low, and consequently no Smuggling, there were very few Officers necessary; and as the Salaries of all those Officers came then, I may say, *out of the King's own Pocket*, we may be assured, that no greater Number of Officers were appointed, nor any greater Salaries allowed, than was absolutely necessary; whereas the Establishment of the Civil List, and the Parliamentary Appropriations, introduced since the Revolution, have made a very great Difference in this Respect. If the Funds appropriated to the Civil List, or to any other particular Service, should now prove deficient, tho' that Deficiency may, perhaps, be occasioned by the *too great* Number of Officers employed in the Collection, or the *too great* Salaries allowed to them, yet it must be made good out of the next Aids granted by Parliament; so that none of the Salaries paid to Officers can now be said to come *out of the King's own Pocket*, or out of what is allowed to him by Parliament, either for supporting the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, or the necessary Charges of the publick Service. They are now *all paid by the People*, by way of Extra-Charge, and as they serve to increase the corrupt Influence of the Crown at Elections, we may very probably have *a greater Number* of Officers in every Branch of Collection, and those Officers provided with *larger Salaries*, than is absolutely necessary; especially as no Parliamentary Inquiry has ever been made into this Affair, nor the Power of the Crown in this Respect limited by any one Regulation, except the Act of the 4th of Queen *Anne*, which provides, that no greater Number of Commissioners shall be constituted for the Execution of any Office,

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than had been for ſuch Office before the 25th of *October*, 1705.

When Gentlemen conſider this, I believe, they will not think the People have got much, or the Conſtitution any Security, by that boaſted Improvement of a Civil Liſt diſtinct from every other Revenue, or by expreſs Parliamentary Appropriations; eſpecially as the Parliament has always, ſince that Time, made extraordinary Grants to the Civil Liſt, as often as it has been aſked, and has never yet made any Inquiry, much leſs found Fault with the Appointment of any one Officer or Salary, tho' Multitudes of new ones are almoſt yearly erecting, and certainly will be as long as it is left to the arbitrary Will of a Miniſter.

It will now appear, that the corrupt Influence of the Crown both in Parliament and at Elections, has been prodigiouſly increaſed *ſince the Reſtoration*, eſpecially ſince the Revolution, by the Increaſe of our Taxes, and the Increaſe of our publick Expence; but theſe are not the only Articles, for in every other Article this Sort of Influence has been increaſed. As our Plantations in *America* have been daily increaſing, both in Riches and Numbers of People, many *new* Poſts have been erected there, and great Additions made to the Profits of the old; and as thoſe Poſts are all in the Diſpoſal of the Crown, they furniſh it with a corrupt Influence equal to the Amount of the Salaries and Profits of all thoſe Poſts or Employments. *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon* have likewiſe contributed to increaſe this corrupt Influence, perhaps as much as they have contributed to increaſe our Trade in the *Mediterranean*. The corrupt Influence of the Crown, ariſing from theſe two together, I ſhall reckon but at 50,000*l.* a Year, becauſe the Salaries of many of the Officers, and the Troops kept there, are paid out of the Revenues of *Great Britain*.

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To theſe I muſt add the corrupt Influence now ariſing from *Ireland*; for as a great Army is kept there, and maintained at the Expence of that Kingdom, as many new Poſts and Employments have been lately created there, and as the Profits of the old, eſpecially their Church Preferments, have greatly increaſed ſince the Reſtoration, they furniſh the Crown, not only with *a Fund* for corrupt Influence ſufficient for governing the Parliament there, but alſo with *a Surplus* to be employed for the ſame Purpoſe here, as appears from the great Number of Natives of *Great Britain* being yearly preferred to ſome Poſt or Employment in *Ireland*. This *Surplus*, conſidering that moſt of the Officers of their Army, many of their Biſhops and Clergymen, and many Civil Officers are Natives of *Great Britain*, I cannot reckon leſs than 150,000*l. per Annum*.

And laſtly, Let us conſider what a large Share of our Church Revenues are at the Diſpoſal of the Crown, or of thoſe appointed by the Crown; and what a Number of lucrative Employments there are in the Law, which are in the Gift of the Crown, or of thoſe appointed by the Crown; I ſay, thoſe appointed by the Crown, becauſe I think, all the Benefices that are in the Gift of the Lord Chancellor or Biſhops, and all the Poſts in the Law that are in the Gift of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Privy Seal, the Judges, and other great Officers, may properly be ſaid to be at the Diſpoſal of the Crown. Theſe likewiſe may all be converted towards gaining a corrupt Influence in Parliament and at Elections; and were but very lately, with ſome Reaſon, ſuſpected to be ſo; conſequently this Fund, which I cannot reckon at leſs than 500,000*l. per Annum*, is to be added to the others, in order to compute the Total of the annual Fund which the Miniſters of the Crown may

convert to the gaining of a corrupt Influence in Parliament and at Elections.

But to give my Readers a diſtinct and full Notion of this Fund, I ſhall ſtate the Account as follows, *viz.*

Fund for Corruption (if a Prime Miniſter pleaſes) ariſing from

The Civil Liſt Revenue —— ——	900,000 *l.*
The Pay and Perquiſites of the Officers of our Army, Navy, and Publick Works —— —— ——	1,500,000 *l.*
The Salaries and Perquiſites of the Officers employed in Collecting, Managing, and Iſſuing our Publick Revenue —— —— —— ——	1,250,000 *l.*
The Salaries and Perquiſites of the Officers in, or belonging to the *Plantations*, *Gibraltar*, and *Minorca*, which do not ariſe from the Revenues of *Great Britain* —— ——	50,000 *l.*
The Salaries and Perquiſites of the Officers in, or belonging to *Ireland*, over and above what is neceſſary to ſecure a Majority there ——	150,000 *l.*
The Benefices in the Church, and the Salaries and Perquiſites, or the Poſts in the Law, which are at the Diſpoſal of the Crown, or of thoſe appointed by the Crown —— —— —— ——	500,000 *l.*
Total annual Amount —	4,250,000 *l.*

The Reader will ſee, that in this Account I have charged the Civil Liſt at its full Value, which I do, becauſe every *Shilling* of it may be converted towards

towards gaining a corrupt Influence in Parliament and at Elections, by obliging every Man that has a Poſt in the Houſhold, every Tradeſman employed, nay, and the Friends of every Perſon to whom any Charity is given, to vote at Elections, according to the Orders they may *expreſly* or *reſervedly*, receive from the Miniſter. Indeed, when a Part of the Civil Liſt Revenue is ſpent abroad, or when a Part of it is lock'd up in a ſtrong Box, it alters the Caſe; but neither of theſe, I hope, is ever done, becauſe if his Majeſty could ſave any Part of it, I am perſuaded, he would *return it to his People*, after the Example of Queen *Elizabeth*; and when he goes to *Hanover*, I hope his Court is ſupported there by his *Electoral Revenues*, in which Caſe none of the People that attend him, can be at any Expence, unleſs it be for clean Linen, which is ſuch a trifling Article, that it deſerves no Notice.

I muſt here break in a little upon the Thread of my Argument, in order to expoſe *a moſt impudent Falſhood* this Author has cook'd up, with deſign to throw a Reflection upon the Adminiſtration at the latter End of Queen *Anne*'s Reign. He repreſents, as if the 100,000*l.* given by that Queen, out of her Civil Liſt, for carrying on the War, was given but for one Year; that it was given by that Adminiſtration; and that as they ſoon after demanded and got 500,000*l.* for diſcharging the Debts of the Civil Liſt, it was a mere Juggle, and a mean Trick to gull the Nation of 400,000*l**. Now the Truth is, her Majeſty gave this 100,000*l.* yearly, during the firſt three Years of her Reign, and after that Time it was converted towards building *Blenheim* Houſe, and towards maintaining the *Palatines* brought over here before the Change in her Adminiſtration; to which two Uſes ſhe

* *See* Faction Detected, *p.* 133, 134.

applied 300,000 *l.* as any one may ſee, that looks into Biſhop *Burnet*'s Hiſtory; from whence the Reader may judge, what Credit is to be given to any Fact advanced or ſtated by this Author.

Now to return to my Argument: As this whole Revenue of 4,250,000 *l.* may be converted towards gaining a corrupt Influence in Parliament and at Elections, by the Miniſter's reſolving, and making it his Practice, to prefer none but ſuch as vote blindly *for the Court* at Elections or in Parliament, and to diſmiſs every Officer that gives *a wrong Vote* in either, we may from thence ſee, how neceſſary it is to think of ſome Methods for guarding againſt this Danger; for to this corrupt Influence of the Crown, we muſt add the *corrupt Influence of all thoſe that are corrupted by the Crown.* If a Nobleman, or a Gentleman of a large Eſtate, allows himſelf to be corrupted by a good Poſt or Penſion, he of courſe will endeavour to corrupt all thoſe that depend upon him for any Favour, and conſequently will employ no Tradeſman nor Servant, but ſuch as vote, or ſuch as have Friends that vote for the *Court Candidate* at every Election, ſo that to this 4,250,000 *l.* we ought to add the yearly Expence of all thoſe that are employed by the Crown, whether that Expence proceeds from the Poſts or Penſions they enjoy, or from their own Eſtates: Nay, we ought likewiſe to add the yearly Expence of all thoſe who expect any Poſt, Penſion, or Favour from the Crown; for as ſoon as a Man becomes an Expectant, he will of courſe become extremely zealous to promote the *Court Intereſt* at all Elections. How much this will amount to cannot be any way computed, becauſe it depends upon the Œconomy, as well as the Property of thoſe that are or expect to be employed by the Crown; but it muſt all together amount to *a great many Millions* yearly, and when we conſider

ſider, that this whole Revenue is united under the ſole Direction of *a Prime Miniſter*, and will, I am afraid, be applied by *every Prime Miniſter* towards ſecuring a corrupt Majority in Parliament, we muſt conclude, that our Conſtitution would now be in the utmoſt Danger, if we had a Prince upon the Throne, that had a *Prime Miniſter*, or that would admit of *any ſuch Application.*

But the Influence of the Crown does not depend ſolely upon the Power of granting Places or Penſions: Titles and Rubans have the ſame Effect upon thoſe that have *more Money than Wit*, as Places and Penſions have upon thoſe that have *more Wit than Money*, as was wittily obſerved by a noble Lord upon the Revival of the *Bath Order*; and to this I muſt add another Sort of Influence, which is that proceeding from *Penal Laws*, eſpecially *Exciſe Laws*, where the Crown has a Power to exact the Penalty with exemplary Rigour, or to mitigate it with unbounded Mercy. This Sort of Influence has likewiſe vaſtly increaſed ſince the *Reſtoration*, and muſt operate ſtrongly upon great Numbers of People, with reſpect to their way of voting at Elections; for I muſt think him not only a very honeſt but a very bold Man, who, notwithſtanding his being ſubject to the *Laws of Exciſe*, gives a Vote at any Election for a Candidate upon the *Country Intereſt*; becauſe no Man can be ſecure againſt his becoming liable to ſome of the Penalties of thoſe Laws. Innocence alone will not protect him: Inadvertency, nay the Inadvertency, perhaps the Treachery of his Servants, may ſubject him to the Rigour of the Law; and no Man can expect *a Mitigation* who has expoſed himſelf to the Reſentment of a Miniſter, by being active againſt *ſome of his Creatures* at an Election.

As to the Increaſe of our *Penal Laws* ſince the *Reſtoration*, eſpecially ſince the Revolution, the Col-

Collection of Statutes is a ſufficient Proof; and as to the Increaſe of our publick Revenues, every Man who examines the Journals of Parliament may be fully convinced; but as few have an Opportunity to do ſo, I muſt refer my Readers to a Pamphlet publiſhed laſt Year, intitled, *A full Anſwer to the Letter from a By-Stander*, &c. p. 160. where it is computed, that all our Taxes together did not, in the 24 Years of King *Charles the Second*'s Reign, one Year with another, amount to full 1,353,095 *l.* whereas they amount now, even in Time of Peace, to at leaſt 5,700,000 *l.* reckoning the Taxes appropriated to the Payment of the Intereſt and Principal of our publick Debts at 3,100,000 *l.* the Taxes appropriated to the Civil Liſt Revenue at 900,000 *l.* the Malt Tax at 700,000 *l.* and a Land Tax of 2 *s. in the Pound* at 1,000,000 *l.* Therefore ſuppoſe, as this Author affirms, that the whole publick Charge from the *Reſtoration* to the *Revolution* was not above 700,000 *l. per Annum*, it muſt be allowed, that the Crown has now a greater *Civil Liſt Revenue* than could at that Time be ſpared for the ſame Purpoſe; but when we conſider, that during the Interval he mentions, we had two Wars with the *Dutch*, almoſt a continual one with the Pyrates upon the *Barbary* Coaſt, a great Addition made to our Navy, and the whole kept in excellent Repair, beſide very frequent and important Negotiations, we muſt conclude it impoſſible to ſuppoſe any Truth in his Aſſertion; and as he gives no Reaſons but his *ipſe dixit* to ſupport it, I believe, his Character for Veracity is not ſo well eſtabliſhed, as to give an Appearance of Truth to what ſeems at firſt View to be impoſſible. However, as I have ſhewn, that the corrupt Influence of the Crown is not confined to the *Civil Liſt Revenue alone*, and that our modern Method of Appropriation ſignifies nothing againſt this corrupt

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Influence, the Quantum of the *Civil Liſt Revenue*, either now or in former Times, muſt appear to be of very little Importance in the preſent Diſpute.

And now let us conſider that Diminution of Power, with regard to corrupt Influence, which this Author boaſts ſo much of, as a conſiderable Acquiſition in Favour of the People: I mean that Alteration made in the Nature of our Conſtitution, by the Act of the 12th of King *Charles the Second*, (Chap. 23.) by which all Tenures were turn'd into free and common Socage, and Tenures by Knight's Service thereby freed from Wardſhip, Marriage, Reliefs, and all military Services, which was, I allow, a conſiderable Loſs to the Crown. But when we conſider what the Crown loſt by this Surrender, and what it got inſtead of it, we ſhall find, *that the Liberties of the People loſt more than they got by this Alteration.* As the chief Support of the Crown, or what is now called the Civil Liſt, depended upon the Rents and Services due to it from *Feodal Tenures*, when this Support was thus taken away, it became neceſſary to provide ſome other Support, and for this Purpoſe the ſame Seſſion of Parliament granted to King *Charles* for Life a Subſidy called *Tonnage and Poundage*, upon all Goods and Merchandize to be exported or imported, which was continued to his Succeſſor, and to every Succeſſor ſince that Time for Life. At the ſame Time an *Exciſe* upon all Liquors made for Retail, or imported, was granted to him for Life, which has likewiſe been continued to his Succeſſors; and another *Exciſe*, of the ſame Nature and Value, was granted to that King, his Heirs and Succeſſors, expreſly mentioned in the Act to be, *in Recompence for the Profits of the Court of Wards and Purveyance.* Thus was there a Foundation laid

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for that ſtupendous Structure of corrupt Influence ſince erected, which proceeds from the Power the Crown has of placing and diſplacing all the Officers of *Cuſtoms and Exciſe*; for by theſe three Acts this Power was put entirely into the Hands of the Crown, and this Precedent has been moſt religiouſly followed ever ſince.

But this was not the only Prejudice. The antient military Force of this Kingdom was by theſe Means annihilated, and as no Care was taken to eſtabliſh any proper military Force in its Stead, a ſtanding Army became neceſſary; for in every Country ſome ſort of military Force is abſolutely neceſſary for its Defence againſt domeſtick Inſurrections, as well as foreign Invaſions. Accordingly, a Foundation was about the ſame Time laid for a Standing Army, by forming two Regiments of Guards, which is now encreaſed to above 30,000 Men, always kept up in *Britain* and *Ireland, even in Times of the moſt profound Tranquillity*; and the Navy being at that Time likewiſe committed intirely to the Care of the Crown, theſe two together threw a great additional Weight of corrupt Influence into the Hands of the Crown, by leaving it in the Power of the Crown to place and diſplace at Pleaſure every Officer in either.

If the Nature of our Conſtitution had been rightly conſidered, it might at that Time have been eaſily foreſeen, that the Power of the Crown would become greater, and more dangerous to the Liberties of the People, by theſe new Sorts of corrupt Influence, than ever it had been, or could be by all the Conſequences of the *Feodal Tenures*. In theſe the Rights of the Crown and the Rights of the Subject were regulated and aſcertained by Law, and our Houſe of Peers were the ſupreme and ultimate Judges of all Diſputes that could

ariſe upon this Head. Theſe *Feodal Tenures* could not therefore create any ſlaviſh Dependence upon the Crown, or any dangerous corrupt Influence in Parliament, much leſs at Elections; becauſe the Crown could not grant away what it had really a Right to, without depriving itſelf of its immediate Subſiſtence, our Parliaments not being then in ſuch a good Humour as to grant large Sums for making good the Deficiencies of the Civil Liſt; and the Crown could inſiſt upon no more than what it had an abſolute Right to, the Party concerned againſt the Crown being always ſuch a one as was able to diſpute the Right at Law, and had, by Way of *dernier Reſort*, a Tribunal to apply to, which conſiſted of hereditary Judges, every one of whom was, *for his own Sake, or the Sake of his Family*, obliged to take Care, *that the Subject ſhould meet with no Oppreſſion*.

But ſuppoſe the Crown had reſolved to grant away its daily Subſiſtence, by granting theſe Wards, Marriages, and Reliefs, for the Sake of gaining a corrupt Influence in Parliament or at Elections, could it have had any Effect? The whole annual Produce of any Revenue the Crown might have by theſe Means, was never, nor could ever be equal to any one Branch of its preſent Fund for Corruption; and beſides, when any ſuch Grant was made, it was always made irrevocable; ſo that the Crown had afterwards nothing but the Gratitude of the Grantee to depend on, and no Gratitude could oblige or induce a Man to deſtroy the Conſtitution of his Country, eſpecially as he thereby rendered the Grant he had obtained precarious.

As the Caſe is in every Reſpect very different with regard to the Officers in our Navy, Army, Cuſtoms, and Exciſe, how ſuperficial muſt thoſe Politicians be, *if they are ſerious*, who boaſt of the Advantage the People have got, or the Security

our Liberties have acquired, by this Alteration in our Conſtitution. But all our Advocates for arbitrary Power *under the Maſque of our Conſtitution*, take Care to repreſent, in the moſt artful magnifying Light, every Power the Crown has been obliged to give up, and to paſs over in Silence, or very much leſſen, every Power the Crown has lately aſſumed or acquired, which this Author has remarkably done through the Whole of his tedious Performance. In the preſent Caſe, in order to magnify the Effect of thoſe *Feodal Powers* which the Crown was obliged at the Reſtoration to give up, he makes five Branches of three; for the firſt three of the five he reckons, can in common Senſe be reckoned but one, *viz.* the Wardſhip of the Heir during Minority, with the Profits of the Eſtate annexed, and a Power to grant both to a third Perſon. Without thoſe Profits the Wardſhip and Guardianſhip of the Heir would have been a Burden; and unleſs thoſe Profits could have been diſpoſed of, they could have created no Dependence. This therefore can be reckoned but one Power flowing from the *Feodal Tenure:* The Right of diſpoſing of the Heir or Heireſs in Marriage was a ſecond; and the Right to one Year's Profits of the Eſtate upon a new Entry, which was called Relief, was a third. But now let us ſee how every one of theſe was by Law regulated and burdened. In the firſt Place, as to every one of them, the King was properly but *Truſtee for the Publick*, and if a wrong Uſe was made of the Right, or the Profits from thence ariſing ſquandered away among Favourites, or applied to wicked Purpoſes, the Parliament had a Right to interpoſe, and did often puniſh Miniſters for adviſing ſuch a Conduct. With regard to *Wardſhip*, the Crown, or its Grantee, was obliged to maintain, educate, and ſupport the Heir according to his Quality; to ſupport the

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Manor-Houſe, Gardens, Parks, *&c.* and to anſwer and fulfil all that became due from the Manor or Lordſhip to the Publick; ſo that the Heir could ſuffer by the Wardſhip no other Way than by not having the Surplus ſaved and preſerved for his Uſe againſt his coming of Age, nor could the Grantee hope to get much by this Surplus, unleſs the Eſtate was very conſiderable; and if it was, the Parliament would probably take Notice of it, if it was granted away by the Crown *for no Conſideration, or for a bad one.*

Then as to *Marriage*, the Crown was obliged to offer ſuch a Match as was agreeable to the Quality of the Heir or Heireſs, and even ſuch a Match the Heir or Heireſs might refuſe upon paying, in moſt Caſes, but a very ſmall Sum of Money; and as to Heireſſes, if ſhe was above fourteen at the Death of her Anceſtor, ſhe was not ſubject to this Incident; ſo that the Crown had then no great Influence in diſpoſing of a rich Heireſs in Marriage, perhaps not ſo great as it has at preſent; for we now find the *Sons of Miniſters* generally married to the *richeſt Heireſſes*, and their *Daughters* to the *greateſt Lords* in the Kingdom. And laſtly, as to *Relief*, it ſhews great Ignorance, *or ſomething worſe*, to ſuppoſe, that it could have an Influence upon the Liberty of any Subject; becauſe it was not in all Caſes aſcertained by Law, and was generally but a mere Trifle.

Therefore when we duly conſider theſe and the other Incidents to *Tenure by Knights Service*, we ſhall have no great Reaſon to admire the Wiſdom of thoſe who aboliſhed this Tenure, and granted to the Crown in Lieu of it, a great Revenue, hereditary or for Life, to be raiſed upon the Body of the People, *and by Creatures whom it could create and annihilate when it pleaſed*; and all this to free our landed Gentlemen, eſpecially our noble and great

Families from thoſe *military Services*, and other Incidents, under which they had acquired their Eſtates; tho' there was nothing more eaſy than to have diſtinguiſhed between the military Services and other Incidents, and to have aboliſhed the latter, without aboliſhing the former, which at all Times, *whether legally due or not*, they ought to be ready to perform, for the Preſervation of themſelves as well as their Country. Such Services *every Freeholder* was of old obliged to perform, and to be *always ready armed* for that Purpoſe, as is apparent from one of *Edward the Confeſſor*'s Laws, which runs in theſe Terms: *Debent enim univerſi Liberi Homines, &c. ſecundum Feodum ſuum, et ſecundum Tenementa ſua, arma habere, et illa ſemper prompta conſervare ad Tuitionem Regni, et ſervitium Dominorum ſuorum juxta Præceptum Domini Regis explendum et peragendum.* This ſhews, that *military Services* were in Uſe among our Anceſtors the *Saxons* as well as *Normans*; and whilſt theſe Services were kept up, they propagated and preſerved ſuch a *martial Spirit* among our *Nobility and landed Gentlemen* as made them the Glory of their Country, and its Safeguard *againſt foreign Invaſions*, as well as the beſt Buckler for defending *its Liberties againſt the Incroachments of the Crown:* Whereas ſince theſe Services were aboliſhed, that *martial Spirit* has been converted too generally into a Spirit of Vanity, Luxury, or Avarice, which may at laſt render them a Nuſance to their Country, and bring them into ſuch Contempt, that the Eſtabliſhment of arbitrary Power muſt be the neceſſary Conſequence; for when the antient, great, and rich Families of a Country appear generally to be govern'd by nothing but their Vanity, Luxury, or Avarice, and conſequently become contemptible to the Body of the People, it becomes eaſy for any bold and artful Invader to overturn the beſt Conſtitution that was ever framed. Many

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of the *Patricians* and great Men at *Rome* foreſaw the Danger that threatened their Commonwealth, by putting *Julius Cæſar* at the Head of a great Army, and giving him the Government of *Ciſalpine* as well as *Tranſalpine Gaul:* They would have prevented it if they could, but the great Families at *Rome*, by their Behaviour from the End of the ſecond *Punic* War, had loſt a great deal of that Reſpect they were wont to have among the People, and had not therefore *Dignity* enough to ſtem the Torrent of thoſe ill-judged Favours which *Julius Cæſar*, by Corruption and other Means, obtained from the Populace.

Having thus ſet the Danger to which we are now expoſed in a true and manifeſt Light, and having ſhewn how greatly it has increaſed, beyond what it can juſtly be ſuppoſed to have been, at any Time before the *Reſtoration*, I muſt ſay, that conſidering what numerous and what plentiful Boons *a Miniſter* has to beſtow upon *his Slaves*, I cannot but admire the Virtue and publick Spirit of my Countrymen, which of late ſo ſucceſsfully withſtood the utmoſt Influence of the Crown in moſt of our Counties and great Cities, and even in ſome of our little Boroughs; but when I conſider, that our little Boroughs ſend up a good deal more than one Half of the Houſe of Commons, and how eaſy it is to make the Crown Influence prevail in almoſt all of them, againſt any Perſonal or Family Influence, I muſt conclude it impoſſible for the *Country Intereſt*, tho' ſupported by the loudeſt and moſt general Complaints among the People, ever to prevail ſo far as to ſend up a Majority of that Houſe, without ſuch a Concurrence of Cauſes as happened at the Choice of this Parliament, and very probably may never happen again. From hence I may, with great Reaſon, ſuppoſe, that the Crown has it now in its Power, by a proper Application

cation of that Influence which I have diſcribed, to have always a Majority of *miniſterial Creatures and Tools* in the Houſe of Commons, and that unleſs this be effectually prevented in this *miraculouſly* choſen Parliament, the Crown will always hereafter have the abſolute Direction of both Houſes.

Upon this Suppoſition I ſhall examine the Fences of our Conſtitution ſet up *ſince the Reſtoration*, and ſo much boaſted of by this Author; and I ſhall ſhew, that no one of them can ſignify a Ruſh for ſecuring either our Conſtitution or the Liberty and Property of any Man in *England*, but that, notwithſtanding all we have done, or can then do any Manner of Way, except by a Mutiny in our Army, our Government will be as deſpotick a Monarchy as the *French* or *Turkiſh* Monarchy now is, or as any Monarchy can be. I believe, it will be granted, that by our Conſtitution our Government is a limited Monarchy: If then the Power of the King be limited, it muſt be limited by ſome other Power; for to ſay that a Power is limited by Laws, without any other Power capable of enforcing the Obſervance of thoſe Laws, would be ridiculous. Even the moſt deſpotick Prince is limited in this Manner: He is limited by the Laws of God and Nature; but as there is no human Power to enforce the Obſervance of thoſe Laws, we find, that few ſuch Princes ſhew any Regard to them, when they happen to be inconſiſtent with their Intereſt or Paſſions. Therefore, the Power of our King muſt be limited by ſome human Power exiſting ſomewhere: While we have a free Parliament, it exiſts in the Parliament, by their having a Power to puniſh any Man that obeys or adviſes the King contrary to Law. When we have no free Parliament, it exiſts in the collective Body of the People, by their having a Right to reſiſt the Crown when it acts contrary to Law, which this Author acknow-

acknowledges they have a Right to do; and if they have ſuch a Right, they may do every Thing proper for rendering that Reſiſtance effectual; for as this Author ſays, *Data facultate datur jus facultatem tuendi.* *

But what can a Parliament ſignify? Can it limit *the Power of the King* if it be under the abſolute Direction *of the King's Miniſters?* Such a Parliament would be worſe than no Parliament at all, becauſe it would give Countenance to Tyranny, and tho' never ſo corrupt, tho' never ſo illegally and corruptly choſen, it would furniſh a Pretence againſt the People's exerciſing their Right to Reſiſtance. What would it ſignify to the People, to have the Principle of Reſiſtance, and of making their King forfeit his Crown, eſtabliſhed by Law, † which, as to Forfeiture, I muſt beg this Author's Leave to differ with him in; for it was not eſtabliſhed at the Revolution, nor has been by any Law ſince. But ſuppoſe the Principle of Forfeiture as well as Reſiſtance were eſtabliſhed by Law, what would the Principle ſignify, if the Sovereign ſhould be always provided with ſuch an Army as muſt render Reſiſtance impoſſible, or at leaſt ridiculous and vain?

I believe, it will be likewiſe granted, that the Life, Liberty, and Property of every Man in *England* depends upon the Integrity of our Judges, and Impartiality of our Juries. As to the Integrity of our Judges, Experience has convinced us, that it very much depends upon their being ſecure of their Places during Life. But what will the *Declaration of our Rights and Liberties* in this Reſpect, made at the Revolution, ſignify, if the Crown can ſtop a Judge's Salary without Danger of any Complaint in Parliament, or remove him by Addreſs of Parliament, whenever it pleaſes? What will

* See *Faction Detected*, P. 144. † See Ditto, P. 143, 144.

will our *Habeas Corpus* Act ſignify, if the Judge applied to, may upon any Pretence refuſe it, and that Pretence ſhould be adjudged to be a juſt or legal one by Parliament as well as by his fellow Judges? What will all our Laws againſt Corruption, and other undue Practices at Elections ſignify, if no Judge will condemn, and conſequently no Perſon proſecute the Authors of ſuch Practices? What will our Trials by Jury ſignify, if the King's Sheriffs be impowered, without Danger, to pack the Panel, and the Jurymen in Danger of a Proſecution in Parliament if they acquit? What Benefit, what Security could we reap from our Laws or our Innocence, when, if Judges and Juries ſhould appear a little ſqueamiſh or unruly, *the Parliament itſelf* would come in Aid of an oppreſſive or revengeful Court, and by Impeachment, Attainder, or Bill of Pains and Penalties ſupply the Defects of *Weſtminſter-Hall?*

In ſhort, a dependent and mercenary Parliament is the *one Thing needful:* Grant but this, and we grant all that can be deſired by the moſt ambitious, the moſt tyrannical Sovereign. How ridiculous then, how wicked is it to attempt to bamboozle us with a long Roll of the Securities we have acquired *ſince the Reſtoration*, when the Queſtion now is, about an Event which muſt render every one of them of no Effect? And when I come to anſwer my fourth Queſtion, I ſhall ſhew, that nothing effectual, nor any Thing like it, has as yet been done by our new Miniſters, for guarding againſt this fatal Event; which was ſo far from being provided againſt at the Revolution, that it was not ſo much as thought of, nor any Article relating to it inſerted in the Declaration of our Rights and Liberties. Will any Man, who conſiders this, ſay, that our Government was then purged of all Excreſcencies of Prerogative? Surely, to turn the Prerogative the

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Crown has of diſpoſing of all Poſts and Offices, towards gaining a corrupt Majority in Parliament, is an Excreſcence of the moſt dangerous Kind, and ought to be guarded againſt by *ſomething more than a Declaration*; for *Declarations* have ever been found of very little Effect, when no proper Regulations are made for preventing their being broke thro' or evaded.

Having now cleared up my firſt Queſtion, and, I hope, to a Demonſtration, I need not take up much Time in anſwering the other three. As to the ſecond, The Pamphlets and Journals patronized by our new Miniſters, whilſt they were in the Oppoſition, the Speeches made in the Houſe of Commons, and the Proteſts enter'd upon the Journals of the Houſe of Lords, many of which were ſign'd by two noble Lords now in high Offices *, will clear up this Point in the moſt authentick Manner; and as they are in every Body's Hand I need not refer to them. I ſhall therefore mention only the two principal Points which the People did, and were moſt induſtriouſly taught to expect. Beſide the Removal of the then Miniſters, and a Change of Meaſures, the People were taught to expect a ſtrict Inquiry into every Branch of our publick Affairs, and *exemplary Juſtice*, not *cruel Revenge*, upon all thoſe that ſhould be found to have betrayed their Truſt, or defrauded the Publick, in order to terrify all future *Miniſters and Tools of Miniſters*, from being guilty of the like Practices; and this the People have at all Times a moſt juſt Title to inſiſt on: Nay in common Prudence they ought to inſiſt on it; becauſe they can never expect their Affairs to be duly and faithfully adminiſter'd if publick Offenders be not detected and puniſhed.

The other Point which the People were taught to expect, was ſome effectual Securities againſt its

* See Debates in Parliament, printed for *Torbuck*.

being ever hereafter in the Power of any wicked Miniſter to attempt, by the Money and Prerogatives of the Crown, to ſecure a corrupt Majority in Parliament. That this had been attempted they had Reaſon to ſuſpect, and the Secret Committee, notwithſtanding all the Obſtructions thrown in their Way, have confirmed this Suſpicion. For this Purpoſe three Laws were propoſed, and patronized by all thoſe in the late Oppoſition, either by their ſpeaking or voting in Favour of them: I mean, *the Penſion Bill*, *the Place Bill*, and *the Repeal of the Septennial Act*; and whatever this anonymous, and, for what I know, obſcure Author may pretend, I am confident, none of our new Miniſters will acknowledge, they thereby intended to impoſe upon and deceive the People; becauſe they have ſhewn, in their Writings or Speeches, that every one of the three was abſolutely neceſſary, for preſerving our Conſtitution againſt that corrupt Influence, which I have ſhewn to be ſo dangerous.

But this Author ſeems to inſinuate, in a Speech he has made and foiſted into his Performance, that neither of theſe Points could be obtained: That the Government, by which I ſuppoſe he means the King, would not conſent to it, and that Government neither could, would, nor ought to be taken by Storm. I agree with him, that this is not to be attempted, when there is any other probable Way of redreſſing the Grievances of the Nation; but when there plainly appears to be no other, this ought and muſt be attempted; and the contrary, I am ſure, would be a very inconſiſtent Doctrine in the Mouth of any Man who pretends to be a *Whig*. What, muſt the Houſe of Commons aſk the King's Leave to impeach a favourite Miniſter? Such a Thing can never be expected without *ſome Sort of Compulſion*, and if a Diſappointment happens, they only are to be blamed,

who

who break *a Concert* by which alone *any Compulſion* can be applied. If then there was a Concert among all thoſe in the Oppoſition, eſpecially the Leaders, that none of them ſhould accept of any Poſt or Employment without *a general Conſent*, as is ſtrongly believed there was, they who broke *this Concert* are to be blamed for all the Diſappointments that afterwards enſued. Was it impracticable or abſurd to keep ſuch a Promiſe? Was it abſolutely neceſſary to ſupply the late Miniſter's Place, or any one of his Places, with one of the Heads of the Oppoſition? Might not the Buſineſs of the Office have been carried on, by appointing one of his Creatures, or one of the then Placemen, *pro Tempore?* If this had been done, the Oppoſition would have kept entire, and would ſoon have got the Direction of both Houſes of Parliament, as well as of all his Majeſty's inferior Councils: They would have acquired Strength, they would have added every Day to their Numbers; and in this Caſe, without any tedious Inquiry, I am convinced the late Miniſter would have been impeached in a very few Days, after the Adjournment was over. Nay, his adviſing ſuch an Adjournment, at ſuch a critical Seaſon, and ſome Things he did in the Office after the Adjournment took Place, might perhaps have been thought good Cauſe of Impeachment againſt him.

This Impeachment even the King himſelf could not have put a Stop to, but by a Diſſolution or Prorogation; and no Man, I believe, would have had the Courage to adviſe, much leſs concur in ſuch a Step. To adviſe depriving the Nation of its Wiſdom, I mean its Parliament, when the Affairs of *Europe*, as well as the Affairs of this Nation, were in ſuch a tickliſh and dangerous Situation, would have been a moſt heinous Crime; and an Advice which his Majeſty would have rejected with Diſ-

dain, becauſe, as the Supplies were not then all granted, nor the Mutiny Bill paſſed, it muſt have thrown the Nation into Confuſion: This no Man who knows his Majeſty's Wiſdom and Prudence, will ſuppoſe he would have done, for the Sake of any Miniſter; nor will any Man, who has a true Regard for his Majeſty's Happineſs and Glory, inſinuate, that there was the leaſt Danger of his behaving *in ſuch an unconſtitutional Manner*.

If he had behaved in ſuch a Manner, and if I were to argue upon the Sentiments of a *certain young Nobleman*, I ſhould ſay, that ſuch a Step might have forced us to have recourſe to a Privilege provided for us by *Magna Charta*, which preſcribes, *That in Caſes of Extremity*, five and twenty *Perſons may be appointed to take the Regency into their Hands, and to exerciſe the higheſt Functions of Government, till the publick Grievances be totally redreſſed* *. But this, I am convinced, his preſent Majeſty will never give the leaſt Occaſion for, as long as he has Miniſters that dare give him ſincere Advice, or a Parliament honeſt enough to prevent their daring to do otherwiſe; and therefore I mention it only as a full Anſwer to thoſe who pretend, that the Nation might have been brought into Confuſion by the late Oppoſition's adhering faithfully to one another, and inſiſting upon every Thing they had taught the People to expect, before any of them had accepted either of Titles or Places from the Crown. If they had inſiſted upon this, they would, I believe, have obtained it, and they might then with great Safety have left the Settlement of the new Government to his Majeſty; becauſe, after theſe Things had been obtained, he could have had no Man about him that would have been willing, nor would any Man have dared to adviſe him to make ſuch a Settlement as would be

* See *London Magazine* for 1742, P. 586.

be diſagreeable to the Nation, or to engage in any Meaſures inconſiſtent with the true Intereſt of *Great Britain*, for the Sake, either of enriching, or of gaining any little Territory, as an Addition to his *Electoral Dominions*. I ſay, no Man would have dared to give any ſuch Advice, when the Puniſhment of a Miniſter, who had done ſo, was recent in his Memory, and when he could have no Hopes of gaining a Majority in Parliament, either by Violence or Corruption.

Now, as to my third Queſtion, I am ſurpriſed, how any Man, that conſiders the Circumſtances of our Court, at the Time this Parliament was choſen, and the ſmall Majority that appeared againſt the Adminiſtration at its firſt Meeting, can ſuppoſe, that the late Change was brought about ſolely by any Power exiſting in the People. I hope, it will be allowed, that the Prince of *Wales* either is, or always ought to be a Part of our Court, and every one knows, that he muſt always have a great Influence in *Cornwall*, by his having the appointing of the Sheriff of that County, and by the Property and Powers he poſſeſſes there; but our late Miniſter had, by his Imprudence, ſeparated his Royal Highneſs from the Court, and when this Parliament came to be choſen, he found it impoſſible to bring about a Reconciliation, by which he loſt one of the beſt Strings in the miniſterial Bow. But this was not his only Imprudence; tho' he knew that *Scotland* was, and had always ſince the Union been the next beſt String in the miniſterial Bow, yet he had, but a little while before this Parliament was choſen, diſobliged, and detached from his Intereſt, a noble Duke lately deceaſed, who, he knew, had, by his great Abilities, as well as his high Quality, a great Influence in that Part of the united Kingdom. When he ſaw theſe two Intereſts united with a general Diſcontent among the People,

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if he had been a bold Politician as well as a cunning one, he would certainly have reſolved to have a conſiderable Majority of his Creatures returned to the enſuing Parliament, by Violence and open Injuſtice, if he had found he could not truſt entirely to Corruption; and if the ſame Methods had been uſed at ſome other Places, as were made uſe of at *Weſtminſter*, and the ſame Sort of Sheriffs appointed in all the Counties of *England*, as were appointed in *Somerſet* and *Pembrokeſhire*, he would have ſucceeded in this Deſign, and would have ſeen a much greater Majority returned in his Favour, than afterwards appeared againſt him; which Majority, *by the modern Practice of weeding*, and by the Deſpair of all, would have very much increaſed before the End of the Seſſion. But the Truth was, he thought the Party in the Oppoſition had been ſo much diſconcerted and divided, by ſome of them oppoſing, and others deſerting the famous Motion in the preceding Seſſion, for removing him from the King's Councils, that it would be impoſſible for them to act with any Harmony or Unanimity at the enſuing Elections, and that conſequently he had no Occaſion to ſtretch the Prerogative to its utmoſt, or to uſe any extraordinary Means for gaining a Majority in the enſuing Parliament; and moreover, his Hopes of purchaſing Members *when they came to Market*, as he himſelf expreſſed it, made him more ſaving of the publick Money at Elections than he would otherwiſe have been.

Theſe Conſiderations muſt convince us, that the late Change in the Adminiſtration proceeded entirely from the Imprudence and the Puſillanimity of the Miniſter; and when we conſider all theſe concurring Cauſes, and reflect, that the Majority againſt him, upon the firſt extraordinary trying Queſtion, I mean that for Chairman of the Committee of Elections,

Elections, conſiſted but of *four*, and even that Majority, or ſome Part of it, perhaps occaſioned by the different Characters of the two oppoſite Candidates, we muſt conclude, that even with reſpect to Elections, the *Power of the People* can never counterbalance the *Prerogatives of the Crown, when ſtretched to their utmoſt Length*; therefore, if ever the *Place-Bill* be brought in again, I hope, it will be made to extend to *Elections*, as well as *Seats in the Houſe of Commons*; for I have ſhewn, that the Crown's gaining a corrupt Influence over a Majority of our Elections, is more dangerous to our Conſtitution than its gaining ſuch an Influence over a Majority of a Houſe of Commons; and, I am ſure, if the Power of the People be not a Counterbalance for that of the Crown, with regard to *Elections*, they have no other Power that can give it *the leaſt Check*, eſpecially as the Crown will always be, by a corrupt Parliament, provided with a numerous ſtanding Army.

I come now to my fourth and laſt Queſtion, which is to examine what we have got by the late Change, how we got it, and whether it is like to be of any Advantage to us. As to Miniſters, we have, 'tis true, got ſome little Change; but as to Meaſures, I ſhall ſhew we have got none, either as to foreign or domeſtick, or at leaſt that the Change that has happened, with regard to foreign, did not proceed from the late Change of our Adminiſtration, but from a Change in the Intereſts and Views of the Court of *Hanover*. It is now generally underſtood, and as generally believed, that the Intereſts and Views of the Electorate of *Hanover* have been the Pole Star, to which our political Needle has pointed ever ſince the Acceſſion of his late Majeſty. By this we were led into three Wars, one with *Sweden*, one with *Muſcovy*, and one with *Spain*, before our late Miniſter came to have the Direction

Direction of our Adminiſtration, and I muſt do him the Juſtice to ſay, that he at firſt honeſtly oppoſed our being ſo led by the Noſe into unneceſſary and pernicious Broils, for which he was turned out of the Adminiſtration ſoon after the Acceſſion; but juſt about the Time of his Return, ſome Diſputes happened between the Court of *Vienna* and the Court of *Hanover*, in relation to *Mecklenberg*, *Bremen* and *Verden*, which raiſed the Reſentment of the latter high againſt the Houſe of *Auſtria*. The purſuing of this Reſentment was the true Touchſtone of all our Politicks, from that Time to the Death of the *late Emperor*, as I could demonſtrate from Facts, Dates, and authentick Papers. This induced us to make a ſeparate and a ſcandalous Peace with *Spain* in the Year 1721: This threw us into the Arms of *France*; and this brought on the Treaties of *Hanover* and *Seville*, the latter of which would have engaged us in a War, in Conjunction with *France* and *Spain*, againſt the *Emperor*, if our late Miniſter had not thrown this Nation headlong, and without the neceſſary previous Precautions, into an expreſs and general Guaranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction*. But the Reſentment of *Hanover* did not end here: The ſame Cauſe induced us not to oppoſe, perhaps to countenance, the Election of *Staniſlaus*, and to forſake the *Emperor*, when he was moſt unjuſtly attack'd on account of his oppoſing that Election. Nay, this Reſentment was at the Bottom the Cauſe of our ſuffering ſo many Indignities from *Spain*; becauſe if we attempted to reſent thoſe Indignities in a proper Manner, we had Reaſon to fear, that *France* would join with *Spain* againſt us, as plainly appeared when we did begin to reſent them; and we could not ſafely fall out with *France* and *Spain* without making court to the *Emperor*, which the Reſentment of *Hanover* would not by any Means permit.

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The pacifick Conduct of our late Miniſter did not therefore ſo much proceed from his Weakneſs or his Blunders, as from his being obliged to direct all his Meaſures by the Intereſt, the Paſſions, and the Views of the Court of *Hanover*; and he had this Advantage of his Predeceſſors, perhaps his Succeſſors too, that he did not on this Account involve the Nation in War and Bloodſhed. The Meaſures of his Adminiſtration are not properly to be called Warlike or Pacifick, they were the Meaſures of the Court of *Hanover*; and if our Meaſures are now the ſame, if they are ſtill directed by the *Hanover* Rudder, that Court may have chang'd its Meaſures but we have not; ſo that if our preſent Meaſures are more adapted to the Intereſt of this Nation, or of *Europe*, it is not owing to the late Change in our Adminiſtration, but to the Views of the Court of *Hanover*'s happening at laſt to coincide with ours: How long that Coincidence will laſt, Time only can diſcover.

Let us now inquire, whether we have any Reaſon to ſuppoſe that the Court of *Hanover* has lately changed its Meaſures. Upon the Death of the late Emperor, the Reſentment of that Court againſt the Court of *Vienna* entirely ceaſed, and the King of *Pruſſia*'s attacking *Sileſia* united theſe two Courts in one common Intereſt, the former to prevent an Aggrandizement of the Power of its Neighbour and Rival, the latter to prevent any Diminution of its own. But this was not all, the Court of *Hanover* thought it had got an Opportunity to extend its own Dominions at the Expence of the *Pruſſian*; and upon this Plan a Scheme was formed for an Alliance between the Queen of *Hungary*, *Great Britain*, *Holland*, and *Hanover*, in order to attack *Pruſſia*, and each Party to hold whatever they ſhould conquer during the War. As the *French*

had ſo lately, and ſo ſolemnly guaranty'd the *Pragmatick Sanction*, the Court of *Hanover*, and conſequently our Court no Way ſuſpected, or perhaps our Fondneſs for this Scheme prevented our ſuſpecting, that *France* would interfere in the Affairs of *Germany*; and if ſhe had not, ſuch an Alliance might certainly have parcelled out the *Pruſſian* Dominions at Pleaſure; but we could not get the *Dutch* into our Scheme, and the Queen of *Hungary* declared, *That ſhe contended for nothing but to avoid any Prejudice to herſelf, nor deſired any Share of thoſe Advantages, which might be very confidently hoped for, from the happy Succeſs of their Arms*, &c.

That ſome ſuch Scheme as this was formed, and that it was formed here at *London*, appears plainly from the Papers laid before the Houſe of Commons, *January* 18th, 1741-2. And farther it appears, that we indulged ourſelves in this Scheme, and in the Hopes that *France* would give no Interruption to it, till the Beginning of *March* following, during which Time the Troops of *Hanover* were augmented, and the *Daniſh* and *Heſſian* Troops were ordered to be taken into *Britiſh* Pay. During this Interval we ſhewed no great Anxiety about any Accommodation between the Queen of *Hungary* and the King of *Pruſſia*, and gave the former moſt expreſs Promiſes of our Aſſiſtance *; whereas if we had purſued the Intereſt of *Great Britain*, and, indeed, the Intereſt of *Europe*, we ſhould have inſiſted upon her giving Satisfaction to *Pruſſia*, upon the Plan of what he offered at the Beginning of the War, as the Condition *ſine qua non* of our giving her any Aſſiſtance. But about the Beginning of *March*, we received certain Advices, that *France*

* *See* Annals of *Europe* for 1741, *p.* 467, 468.

France would interfere in the Affairs of *Germany*; that ſhe would aſſiſt the Duke of *Bavaria* in attacking the Queen of *Hungary*'s *German* Dominions, and the *Spaniards* in attacking her *Italian*; and what was certainly the moſt dreadful to the Court of *Hanover*, that ſhe was offering very advantageous Terms to the King of *Pruſſia*, in order to induce him to join in the Alliance. Upon this the Court of *Hanover* entirely altered its Tone, and of courſe our Court did the ſame. We preſſed the Queen of *Hungary* to make it up at any Rate with the King of *Pruſſia*; but as we, at the ſame Time, promiſed her our Aſſiſtance at all Events, ſhe gave little Heed to our Solicitations. Theſe Promiſes we continued till Monſieur *Maillebois* arrived with his Army in *Weſtphalia*, and forced the Court of *Hanover* to beg a Neutrality; and then we were ſo far from performing the abſolute Promiſes we had made to her *Hungarian* Majeſty, that we permitted our declared Enemies the *Spaniards* to paſs unmoleſted by our Squadrons, in order to attack her in *Italy*.

As the Court of *Hanover* had been thus diſappointed in their favourite Scheme, by the Intervention of *France:* As they had been bullied into a Neutrality by Monſieur *Maillebois*'s Army's marching up almoſt to their Frontier; and as they had been moſt contemptuouſly talk'd of by the *French* Miniſters at foreign Courts, eſpecially the *Hague*, on Account of this very Neutrality, this could not but raiſe their Reſentment againſt the Court of *France*, and from that Time they certainly were watching for an Opportunity to wreck their Revenge upon that Court. Theſe were the Circumſtances of the Court of *Hanover* when the Change happened in our Adminiſtration: Theſe were lucky Circumſtances for *Europe*,

as well as this Nation, if a proper Uſe had been made of them, becauſe they made the Views of *Hanover* coincide with the Intereſt of both; and therefore, if our late Miniſter had continued in Power, I muſt ſuppoſe, he would have taken the firſt Opportunity to purſue this Reſentment againſt *France*, and would, perhaps, have purſued it with more Addreſs, and leſs Expence, than our new Miniſters have done; for his Abilities are known to be ſuperior to any of theirs, and as to Character for Honeſty they are pretty equal: I believe none of them will ſacrifice their Country, if they can thereby propoſe no Advantage to themſelves, which is the utmoſt Degree of Honeſty, if it can be called one, that I can from their Conduct allow, either to the old Miniſter, or any of thoſe who are leading Men among the new.

Very luckily for our new Miniſters, an Accident happened ſoon after they got their Poſts, I cannot ſay their Power, which afforded the Court of *Hanover* an Opportunity to purſue its Reſentment againſt *France*, and our Miniſters of courſe an Opportunity of falling in with the prevailing Humour of their Country. The King of *Pruſſia* found himſelf ſo ſlighted, and ill uſed by the *French*, that he reſolved to make up Matters with the Queen of *Hungary*; and the latter finding ſhe could expect nothing effectual from *England*, as long as *Hanover* was in Danger on the Side of *Pruſſia*, as well as *Weſtphalia*, reſolved to yield any Thing to *Pruſſia*. Theſe mutual Reſolutions ſoon brought the two Courts to an Agreement, and our Miniſters had the Honour to act as Mediators, upon which they have ever ſince plumed themſelves, as if this Agreement had been the Effect of their great Addreſs. If they had brought

Pruſſia into an Alliance againſt *France*, they might have pretended to ſome Merit; but to purchaſe his Neutrality, after he had been highly affronted by the *French*, at a higher Price than he at firſt offered his utmoſt Aſſiſtance, or to bring the Queen of *Hungary* into this Agreement, after ſhe plainly ſaw ſhe would infallibly be ruined if ſhe did not accept of it, ſurely required no great Addreſs in the Mediators.

As this Agreement with *Pruſſia* was ſoon after followed by another with *Saxony*, and both their Troops in courſe drawn off, the Succeſs of the Queen of *Hungary*'s Troops againſt the *French* and *Bavarians* extended the Views of the Court of *Hanover*, and gave it Hopes of being able, not only to purſue its Reſentment yet farther againſt *France*, but by making itſelf conſiderable, to get ſomething by the Event of the War, which was now become dubious. This gave our Miniſters here a farther Scope for indulging the prevailing Humour among the People, by reſolving to give ſome real Aſſiſtance to her *Hungarian* Majeſty, both by our Troops and Squadrons; and this our late Miniſter, in the like Circumſtances, would certainly have done as well as they; but I doubt if he would have gone farther: I doubt if he would have adviſed taking any *Hanoverian* Troops into our Pay; and my Reaſon for doubting is, *becauſe he was in the Cloſet*; whereas our new Miniſters found it neceſſary either to propoſe or agree to this, *in order to get into the Cloſet*. However, as the Court of *Hanover* are guided by their Fears (which ſeems to be the chief governing Paſſion) as well as their Reſentments, and as it was dangerous for that Court to act againſt the *Emperor*, it was reſolved to ſee what another Year would produce, before either the *Britiſh*, *Hanoverian*, or

Heſſian

Heſſian Troops ſhould enter upon Action; but the taking the *Hanoverian* Troops into *Britiſh* Pay was not, upon any Account, to be delayed. To furniſh a Pretence for this, the *Britiſh* Troops were ſent to *Flanders*, and the *Hanoverians* and *Heſſians* were to march from *Germany* to join them, though it was known, from what the *Dutch* had declared, that they could be of no Uſe to the Queen of *Hungary* till they marched back again to *Germany*.

I muſt therefore conclude, that the Honour of having ſixteen thouſand *Hanoverians* in our Pay, at a moſt monſtrous Price, is all, with reſpect to foreign Affairs, that we have got by the late Change in our Adminiſtration. I ſay, a monſtrous Price, for though the King of *Great Britain* is not to pay the Elector of *Hanover* any Subſidy, as this Author cunningly obſerves, yet this is fully compenſated by the Levy Money; and I muſt obſerve, that in 1702, we paid neither Subſidy nor Levy Money for the *Hanoverians* we then took into our Pay, and we then paid, ſuppoſing at the preſent Rate of Exchange, but 98,819 *l. Sterling* for ten thouſand *Hanoverians* for one Campaign *, whereas we now Pay 657,888 *l. Sterling* for ſixteen thouſand *Hanoverians* for one Campaign; for I will ſtill ſay, we had no Occaſion to have taken them into our Pay till the Beginning of laſt Summer, becauſe it was ridiculous to aſſemble an Army in *Flanders*, in order to act in *Germany*, and ſtill more ridiculous to aſſemble them in *Flanders eight Months* before they could act any where.

As this is all we have got by the late Change in our Adminiſtration, I am ſure we cannot ſay we have reaped, or can reap any Advantage from it;

* *See a Pamphlet, intitled,* Publick Diſcontent accounted for, *&c.*

it; for if we have ſuch Succeſs in the War, as to reap any Advantage from it by our Victories, which is ſeldom our Caſe, it is to be imputed to the late new Turn given to the Reſentments of *Hanover*, and not to our new Miniſters; becauſe if the *French* Court, inſtead of bullying *Hanover* into their Meaſures, had thought of adding ſome little Territory to that Electorate, it is apparent, from the Conduct of our new Miniſters ever ſince they were preferred, and from the Methods they took to be preferred, that they would have been as far from oppoſing or counter-acting the Views of the Court of *Hanover* as ever the old was, and if that Court had been to have a Share in the Partition made of *Germany* by the *French*, I believe, they would have been very far from having any Views of aſſiſting the Queen of *Hungary*, or oppoſing that Partition. But when ſuch a Partition was under Conſideration, to neglect them entirely, to bully them into it without the leaſt Share, and to make a Joke of them after it was done, was an unpardonable Inſult, eſpecially as they had *Great Britain* to back them in their Reſentments.

This is the true Cauſe of any Share we have yet taken, or may be obliged to take in the preſent War in *Germany*, let the Conſequence be what it will. I wiſh it may be ſucceſsful; but if it is not, our new Miniſters are alone to blame. If they had ſtood by their old Friends, till Satisfaction had been given to a much injured People, and the Nation taken out of foreign Leading-ſtrings, by the Settlement of a national Adminiſtration, the *Dutch* would have joined ſincerely and heartily with us, becauſe they could have put Confidence in this Nation, when governed by domeſtick and popular Councils; but they can put no Confidence

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in us, when governed by foreign Councils that are both hated and deſpiſed by the People: If our Armies had been under no Influence but *True Engliſh*, the *Dutch Troops* would not have been prevented from *incamping in a Line* with the other allied Troops, by pretending to make them yield the *Poſt of Honour*, not only to the *Hanover Troops* in *Britiſh* Pay, but even to the *Troops of Hanover* that ſerved there as *Electoral Troops*. The King of *Pruſſia* would have joined with us, becauſe he could have put Confidence in the Guaranty of *Great Britain*, when governed by *Britiſh* Councils; but he can put no Confidence in thoſe Councils, which were but lately *forming Schemes* for diſpoſſeſſing him of the greateſt Part of his Dominions. In ſhort, when *Britiſh* Councils are governed by *Britiſh* Influence alone, every Sovereign State in *Europe* will readily join with us, in putting down the Power of any one State that becomes formidable to all the reſt; becauſe, as it is *againſt our Intereſt* to have any Dominions upon the Continent, they can never be apprehenſive of our *deſigning to incroach* upon any of them. Whereas when our Councils are but ſuſpected of being under the Influence of any foreign State, all the Neighbours of that foreign State will be jealous of us, and apprehenſive, *leſt the Riches and Power of* Great Britain *ſhould be turned towards extending the Dominions of that foreign State, by which our Councils are ſuppoſed to be directed*; and I heartily wiſh this *very Jealouſy* may not at preſent detach from our Intereſt, not only the King of *Pruſſia*, but the Kingdom of *Sweden*, and the potent Empire of *Ruſſia*. This ſhews how neceſſary it was for us to have eſtabliſhed *a national and independent Adminiſtration*, before we took any Part in the preſent War: If we had, we might very probably have

have been able to form a Confederacy that would have *commanded Succeſs*, unleſs Providence had declared againſt us, which, in ſo juſt a Cauſe, we had no Reaſon to fear, eſpecially as our *Armies* would have been commanded by the *beſt Generals*, and our *Councils* directed by the *beſt and wiſeſt Men* in the Nation.

Now with Regard to domeſtick Affairs, what have we got by the late Change? We have got a Law for excluding *two* or *three Dozen*, call it *two* or *three hundred* Placemen from Seats in the Houſe of Commons: Even this inſignificant Boon we got not by Means of any of thoſe who can be called *new* Miniſters. The Bill was brought in to give ſome Sort of Satisfaction to a Gentleman, ſince advanced to the Peerage, who now finds, or, I am ſure, ought to find, *that he has been betrayed by thoſe in whom he put his greateſt Truſt*. When all Placemen have ſtill Votes at Elections, when the Crown has ten thouſand Placemen, beſide thoſe excluded by former Laws, who may by its Influence be brought into the Houſe of Commons, will any one ſay, that the excluding of *two* or *three Dozen*, or even *two* or *three hundred* of them, can be the leaſt Shadow of a Security againſt the Crown's having a corrupt Majority in that Houſe? Yet this is the only Security we have got from thoſe, who for many Years have been prophaning the ſacred Name of Patriotiſm, for no other End than to graſp at Power; therefore, glad I am to hear, that when they thought they had got it, they found they graſped nothing but a Shadow; and, I believe, the whole Nation will join with me in Joy, and in applying to them the Quotation with which this Author concludes his tedious Performance. As all the other *falſe Facts* and *falſe Reaſonings* contained in this *great Book*, which in-

deed conſiſts of nothing elſe, have already been fully anſwered, eſpecially in the Pamphlet, intitled, *A Defence of the People*, &c. I ſhall conclude with explaining the Difference between *Party* and *Faction*, which this *ſhallow-pated Politician* does not ſeem to underſtand, though he pretends to be a *Detector of Faction*. *A Party* is, when a great Number of Men join together *in profeſſing a Principle, or Set of Principles*, which they take to be for the *publick Good*, and therefore endeavour to have them eſtabliſhed and univerſally profeſſed among their Countrymen. *Faction* again is, when a Number of Men unite together *for their own private Advantage*, in order to force themſelves into Power, or to continue themſelves in Power after they have once got in. From hence one may ſee, that *a Set of Miniſters, or a Prime Miniſter and his Tools*, may be *a Faction*; I believe they generally are ſo, and I appeal to the Reader if *ſuch a Faction* is not more likely to be made up of ſuch Men as this Author deſcribes in his ſecond Page, than *any Oppoſition* whatever; becauſe the former can give *preſent Rewards*, the latter nothing but *diſtant Hopes*; and every Rogue knows, that *a Bird in Hand is worth two in the Buſh*.

We may likewiſe from theſe Definitions ſee, that a Partyman, properly ſo called, may be a very honeſt Man, and a good Countryman, tho' miſtaken in his Principle; whereas a factious Man can never be an honeſt Man, or a good Countryman; but as factious Men would certainly loſe *their End* if they declared *their Motive*, they therefore always rank themſelves under the Banner of ſome Party, and conſequently it is very difficult to determine; at the very Time of Action it is, indeed, impoſſible to determine, whether

ther a Man be a Partyman, or a factious Man; but by the whole Tenor of a Man's Conduct, it may be with great Certainty determined; for a Partyman never deſerts his *Principle* as long as he thinks it for the *publick Good*, but immediately does, as ſoon as by Experience he finds it to be deſtructive of the *publick Good:* Whereas a factious Man will purſue the *Principle he has profeſſed* to the *Deſtruction of his Country*, if he finds he can no other Way arrive at, or retain Power; but when he finds he can attain either of theſe Ends, by deſerting the *Principle he before profeſſed*, he does it without Ceremony, and very often declares himſelf openly of a *contrary Principle or Party*.

The high Pretences to Prerogative ſet up by King *James the Firſt*, formed thoſe two Parties, which were in the next Reign diſtinguiſhed by the Names of *Roundhead* and *Cavalier*, and in the following Reign by the Names of *Whig* and *Tory:* Theſe two Parties had each a *plauſible Principle*, as the Foundation and Criterion of their Party: The *Whigs* profeſſed *Liberty*, the *Tories Loyalty*, without conſidering that theſe two Principles are very conſiſtent: Nay, a late Author has undertaken to ſhew, that neither can ſubſiſt without the other *: The two Parties having thus ſet up diſtinct Banners, factious Men have ever ſince ranged themſelves under one or other of theſe two Banners; and therefore neither Party is anſwerable for what is done by the factious Men amongſt them. The factious Men among the *Whigs* overturned our Conſtitution in the Reign of King *Charles the Firſt*, and were therefore deſerted by all true *Roundheads*, or *Whigs*, who joined in calling home

* *See a Pamphlet, intitled,* The Reformation Reformed, *&c.*

King *Charles the Second.* The factious Men among the *Tories* had very near done the ſame in the Reign of *James the Second*, and were therefore deſerted by all true *Tories*, who joined in calling over the Prince of *Orange*. For this Reaſon, both Parties ought to be jealous of their Leaders, and take Care, that they do not lead them into Extremes; for factious Men, let them profeſs what they pleaſe, will always be for ingroſſing Power, and *Whig-Leaders* have once already, under the Pretence of *Liberty*, introduced *Slavery*. Therefore, the *Whigs* in particular ought to be jealous of their Leaders, eſpecially after they have got Poſſeſſion of Power; for ever ſince theſe two Parties began to be diſtinguiſhed, our Hiſtories will inform us, that thoſe in Power will be for preſerving and even extending it, and that *Whigs*, when they became Miniſters, have always been for preſerving, and even extending the Power of the Crown; which may convince us, *that our Liberties are not a Bit the more ſecure, becauſe thoſe who formerly called themſelves* Whigs *are employed in the Adminiſtration.*

I ſhall not pretend to vindicate the Conduct of either of theſe two Parties, becauſe they, or at leaſt the factious Men among them, have been both in their Turns to blame, and as it happens in all Contentions, by their mutual Violence they have often drove each other to Extremes, for their Principles may be eaſily reconciled: Paſſive-Obedience and Non-Reſiſtance is due to the ſupreme Power of every Society; but as the ſupreme Power of this Society does not belong to the King, but to the three Branches of our Legiſlature, therefore he may, and ought to be reſiſted, when he pretends to exerciſe a Power which does not belong to him, or deprives us of a free and inde-

independent Parliament, which is the only Method whereby we can have a legal Redreſs of any Grievance. For this Reaſon, I ſay, I ſhall not pretend to juſtify the Conduct of either Party; but as this Author has thrown out ſuch a deal of ſcurrilous Language againſt the *Tories*, I muſt inform him, that a very great Man among the *Whigs*, and a much better Judge than he, ſaid ſome Years ago of the *Tories*, that *they had always ſupported the Prerogatives of the Crown with Honour, and the Liberties of their Country with Diſcretion*; and I will add this Encomium upon the Gentlemen now affected to be diſtinguiſhed by the Name of *Tories*, that *they have had no Share in the Adminiſtration for* twenty-nine *Years paſt, and have been reviled by one who ſets himſelf up as an Advocate for Corruption.*

Let this voluminous Author therefore give what Names he pleaſes, I believe, he will find it hard to convince any *true Whig*, that there is now ſuch a Thing as a *Tory-Party* ſubſiſting. Is there now any one Man in the Kingdom that profeſſes *the Principle* of Paſſive-Obedience and Non-Reſiſtance, as formerly profeſſed and inculcated by ambitious Churchmen? Is it not ridiculed by every one of thoſe whom ſuch Gentlemen as this affect to call *Tories?* There is therefore no Party now in this Kingdom: All honeſt Men are united in this Principle, That the Door ought to be ſhut againſt *Slavery, let it approach in what Diſguiſe it will.* But there is *a Faction* amongſt us, who, under Pretence of ſupporting the Prerogatives of the Crown, are for introducing Slavery, the very worſt Sort of Slavery, *corrupt* Hanoverian *Slavery*. If the abſolute and arbitrary Power the Crown now has over almoſt all the Poſts and Employments in the publick Service is not carefully limited and regulated, we ſhall, we muſt be Slaves, Slaves governed

verned by *Hanoverian* Councils, and thoſe Councils ſupported, and their Decrees enforced by a *corrupt Majority* in the Parliament of *Great Britain*. This is a Principle which the Faction dare not own, but the Eſtabliſhment of this Principle will be the certain Conſequence of the Principle they profeſs. The Principle they profeſs, which is that of preventing any Limitation's being put upon the moſt dangerous Prerogative of the Crown, if it be any Thing, is a *Tory* Principle. Let them therefore abjure the Name of *Whig*; let them aſſume the Name which truly belongs to them: *Hanoverians* is by far too good a Name for them: *Slave* itſelf is too good a Name, becauſe moſt Men that are Slaves, are made ſo by *Compulſion*; but theſe make a *voluntary* Surrender of their Freedom, for the Sake of ſatisfying their Vanity, Luxury, or Avarice; let them therefore be called *corrupt Slaves: Corrupt* Hanoverian *Slaves*.

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

PAGE 26, l. 26. dele the *Comma*, and for *or*, r. *of*; p. 31, l. 14. for *Relicts*, r. *Reliefs*; p. 34, l. 19. for *and*, r. *or*; p. 35, l. 27, dele *not*; p. 48, l. 8. for *Mecklenberg*, r. *Mecklenburg*; p. 56, l. 18. for *putting*, r. *pulling*.